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Production 5  
Special Projects

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Office of the Director

DCI/IC 74-1617

24 MAY 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Director, National Security Agency  
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and  
Research, Department of State  
Deputy Director for Intelligence/CIA  
Deputy Director for Operations/CIA  
Deputy Director for Science & Technology/CIA  
D/DCI/NIO  
Chairman, JAEIC

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Community Post-Mortem Report  
Concerning the Indian Nuclear Detonation

1. Because of the significance of the event, I have asked the Intelligence-Community Staff to assess the performance of the Community vis-a-vis the detonation of a nuclear device by India on 18 May. Emphasis will be placed on the degree to which the event was anticipated (both in a technical and a political sense) in finished intelligence publications and on the availability of data permitting or precluding such anticipation. Thus, as with our previous post-mortem investigations, it will be necessary to review the analytical record and to examine related collection activities as well.

2. Some of you may be planning to conduct your own reviews. If so, we would appreciate notification; time permitting, we would, of course, hope to make use of your findings, as appropriate.

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3. I have designated [redacted] of the Product Review Division of the IC Staff as action officers for this project. They will wish to consult with officers in your organization and may request assistance in identifying and obtaining material for review. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

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[redacted]  
Daniel O. Graham

Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the

Intelligence Community

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
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[Redacted]

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## **POST-MORTEM REPORT**

*An Examination of the Intelligence Community's  
Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974*

**A Study Produced Under Intelligence Community Staff Auspices**

**for the**

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

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## **POST-MORTEM REPORT**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In the months prior to India's 18 May nuclear test, the intelligence community failed to warn US decision makers that such a test was being planned. This failure denied the US Government the option of considering diplomatic or other initiatives to try to prevent this significant step in nuclear proliferation.
2. The intelligence community had long known that India was capable of producing and testing a nuclear device. It had also estimated as far back as 1965 that India would "in the next few years" detonate a nuclear device. Its inability to predict the actual event was due essentially to two factors: inadequate priority against an admittedly difficult target, and lack of adequate communications among those elements of the community, both collectors and producers, whose combined talents were essential to resolving the problem.

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4. The proper collection strategy against the nuclear proliferation target will necessarily differ from one nth country to another. It can be determined only by integrated analysis conducted by representatives of all collection modes and by both technical and political analysts. Once determined, it must be reviewed and reinforced by continuing close communications among all concerned.
5. Most importantly, success against the nth country intelligence problem will require that the community accord it a higher priority than it has received to date.
6. Specific recommendations are provided in paragraphs 34-38.

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